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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFENDING MARRIAGE: The
Defense of Marriage Act, Romer v. Evans and the Cultural
Battle They Represent
I. INTRODUCTION.'
There is a battle raging in America as real as any military
battle fought by American soldiers in the jungles of Vietnam or on
the deserts of Iraq. It is a battle pitting brother against sister,
parents against children, American against American. The objec-
tive: "the domination of one cultural and moral ethos over all
others."2 This domination occurs in the law when one group wins
a court decision consistent with that group's view of what truth is.
This comment will first examine the clash of two views of truth.
Then this conflict over truth will be examined by evaluating the
constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act3 (DOMA) recently
1. I wish to thank the people who served as sounding boards for many of the
ideas expressed in this comment. I am especially grateful to Professor William
Woodruff for his input regarding the applicability of the Defense of Marriage Act
to one's sexual orientation, to Professor Richard Bowser for his helpful editorial
comments, and to my wife, Amy.
2. JAMES DAvisON HUNTER, CULTURE WARs: THE STRUGGLE To DEFINE
AMERICA 42 (1991).
3. The Defense of Marriage Act is contained in 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1997)
and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West 1997).
1 U.S.C.A. § 7. Definition of "marriage" and "spouse"
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.
28 U.S.CA. § 1738C. Certain acts, records, and proceedings and the
effect thereof
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
159
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signed into law by President Clinton and the impact of Romer v.
Evans4 on the Act.
The question of first importance when conducting a constitu-
tional analysis is whose view of truth will judges and legislators
use when deciding cases and enacting laws. The lens through
which one looks at the Constitution, legislative enactments, city
ordinances or even a posted speed limit is the lens of world view.
Noted intellectual, apologist, and moral philosopher Francis A.
Schaeffer writes:
People have presuppositions, and they will live more consistently
on the basis of these presuppositions than even they themselves
may realize. By presuppositions we mean the basic way an indi-
vidual looks at life, his basic world-view, the grid through which
he sees the world. Presuppositions rest upon that which a person
considers to be the truth of what exists. People's presuppositions
lay a grid for all they bring forth into the external world. Their
presuppositions also provide the basis for their values and there-
fore the basis for their decisions. 5
As a result, how one views the world will dictate one's deci-
sions, conclusions, and arguments. To begin the debate over
homosexual marriage with a constitutional analysis misses this
most basic question of world view. For neither side in this war
will be able to understand the other side's arguments until they
understand what that side's presuppositions are that lead to their
view of what truth is.
The cultural war which homosexual marriage represents pits
two world views in stark conflict, illuminating each side's view of
the truth. One side views truth as subjective and pliable by
changes in the culture. The other side views truth as tied to an
objective standard. How one aligns along either of these two sides
determines how one argues a legal position or judges a dispute.
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
4. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
5. FRANcis A. SCHAEFFER, How Should We Then Live?, in THE COMPLETE
WORKS Op FRANCIs A. SCHAEFFER 5 (1982).
[Vol. 19:159160
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A. World View #1 - Truth is subjective.
The world view that truth is subjective is displayed in the
writings of many same-sex marriage and gay rights proponents.
Ms. Deborah Henson provides an insight into the view many gay
rights proponents have concerning what standard should be used
to decide policy issues involving homosexuality. She writes:
enacting legislation or deciding cases based on majoritarian
morality is specious at best. First, the moral code changes with
the times. Second, majoritarian morality is simply an inequitable
and illogical basis on which to support lawmaking that pertains to
such an important and personal institution as marriage.6
She goes on to conclude that moral neutrality is the best approach
and that, "judges should abandon moral bases in judicial decision-
making" based on her claim of increased acceptance of "alterna-
tives to the traditional heterosexual lifestyle."7 Ms. Henson's
world view is based on the belief that truth is subjectively molded
by the current culture and is demonstrative of same-sex marriage
proponents.
B. World View #2 - Truth is tied to an objective standard.
The other view of truth is that it is tied to an objective stan-
dard. The Congressional Record is replete with comments made
by congressmen and senators referring to an objective standard of
truth. The Congressional Record reflects that this traditional
moral basis is one of the strongest impetuses for the promulgation
of the DOMA. Congressman Talent emphasizes "standards" of
right and wrong "sanctioned by millennia of tradition" and sup-
ported by Judeo-Christian teachings.' Congressman Barr empha-
sizes that "we must maintain a moral [and ethical] foundation" in
America.9 Congresswoman Seastrand says the bill will "fortify
marriage against the storm of revisionism."'0
6. Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister
States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of
Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following
Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551, 595 (1994).
7. Id. at 596.
8. 142 Cong. Rec. E1346-01 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of
Congressman Talent).
9. 142 Cong. Rec H7480-05 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of
Congressman Barr).
10. 142 Cong. Rec H7480-05 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of
Congresswoman Seastrand).
1996] 161
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These comments are demonstrative of persons expressing the
view that homosexuality is morally wrong and should not be
encouraged by the state. This group believes that truth is objec-
tive and the standard is not societal relevance but traditional reli-
gious teachings of morality.
C. Clash of world views in Romer v. Evans.1
These two world views are in constant conflict. One of the
clearest examples of this conflict in the courts is the recent deci-
sion of Romer v. Evans. The distance between the reasoning in
Romer and the reasoning in Bowers v. Hardwick,'2 decided only
ten years earlier, provides an example of judges taking sides in
the cultural battle.13 The Supreme Court in Romer, declared a
Colorado Constitutional Amendment (Amendment 2) prohibiting
special rights for homosexuals invalid because it "seems inexplica-
ble by anything but animus towards the class it affects."' 4 The
majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy, however, did not
address how this "animus" applied to uphold the State of Georgia's
anti-sodomy law determined to be constitutional in Bowers.' 5
In Bowers v. Hardwick the Court declared that a majority
belief that homosexuality is immoral and unacceptable consti-
tuted a rational basis for upholding Georgia's anti-sodomy law.16
On the other hand, the Romer majority opined, "[b]y requiring
that the classification bear a rational relationship to an independ-
ent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classifications
are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group bur-
dened by the law."117 In Justice Kennedy's view, a legitimate legis-
lative end does not include an activity seen by a majority of the
voters as immoral.
Justice Kennedy never clearly states what he means by "ani-
mus." However, later in the opinion he does dismiss the "primary
rationale" of "religious objections to homosexuality" as being so far
11. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
12. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia anti-sodomy laws as
constitutional).
13. For an insightful examination of Romer v. Evans see Richard F. Duncan,
Wigstock and Kulturkampf: Supreme Court Storytelling, the Culture War, and
Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345 (1997).
14. 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
15. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
16. Id. at 196.
17. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
[Vol. 19:159162
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removed from Amendment 2 that they warrant no credit.18 The
only valid rationale is the "changing" view of some accepting
homosexuality as an "alternative lifestyle."
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, in his dissent to Romer
seems to accurately discern what the "animus" Justice Kennedy
refers to is. Justice Scalia writes that the "only sort of 'animus' at
issue here [is] moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same
sort of moral disapproval that produced the centuries-old criminal
laws that we held constitutional in Bowers.""9 Justice Scalia's
view that truth is tied to an objective standard is evidenced
throughout his dissent by references to "traditional moral val-
ues,"20 and "our moral heritage."2 '
Romer presents a clear battle over truth expounded by the
majority and the dissent. The majority sees truth as pliable by
culture and not tied to any objective standard. The dissent views
truth as tied to an objective standard of right and wrong. In fact,
Justice Scalia recognizes the reality of the battle when he states,
"... I think it no business of the courts (as opposed to the political
branches) to take sides in this culture war"22 and later, "[w]hen
the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the
knights rather than the villeins-and more specifically with the
Templars, reflecting the view and values of the lawyer class ... 23
With an understanding of these two prepositional views of
truth we now turn to examine one skirmish in this cultural war -
18. Id. at 1629.
19. Id. at 1633.
20. Id. at 1636.
21. Id. at 1633.
22. Id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia is referring to a quote
from Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885), which rejected a constitutional
challenge to a federal statute denying recognition of statehood if those in the
territory engaged in polygamy. The Murphy court stated:
[Clertainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and
necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth, fit to
take rank as one of the co-ordinate States of the Union, than that which
seeks to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting
in and springing from the union for life of one man and one woman in
the holy estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable
and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that reverent morality
which is the source of all beneficent progress in social and political
improvement.
Id. Justice Scalia refused to apply this quote as praise for homosexual
monogamy.
23. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637.
1996]
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the issue of homosexual marriage in the context of the constitu-
tionality of the Defense of Marriage Act. Specifically, this com-
ment will examine the DOMA to determine whether it is
constitutional under the Full Faith and Credit Clause24 and
whether it denies homosexuals equal protection of the law in light
of the recent Supreme Court decision in Romer v. Evans.
25
II. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE DEFENSE OF
MARRIAGE ACT.
Not since Plato's recommendation that the institution of mar-
riage and the family be replaced by the state26 has our concept of
what marriage means been challenged as it is today by same-sex
marriage proponents. The Hawaii Supreme Court recently
declared that a Hawaii statute denying people of the same sex the
right to marry amounted to denial of equal protection of the law,
specifically gender based sexual discrimination. The court held
the statute to be unconstitutional under the Hawaii Constitution
unless the state could demonstrate "that (a) the statute's sex-
based classification is justified by compelling state interests and
(b) the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridg-
ment of the applicant couples' constitutional rights."2 8 In an
attempt to prevent the Hawaii Supreme Court from redefining
marriage for every state Congress recently passed the Defense of
Marriage Act.29
Those expressing opinions on the constitutionality of DOMA
break down into two groups. The first group believes the act is
unconstitutional because it intrudes into a problem best handled
24. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST art. IV § 1.
25. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
26. PLATO: FIVE GREAT DIALOGUES (B. Jowett trans., Louise R. Loomis ed.,
1942).
27. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 82 (Haw. 1993).
28. Id. at 64.
29. On December 3, 1996, the Circuit Court of Hawaii determined that the
State did not meet the requirements of a narrowly tailored and compelling
government interest necessary to satisfy the strict scrutiny test and therefore
found that it was unconstitutional as a matter of law to deny homosexual couples
a marriage license. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
(1996)).
[Vol. 19:159164
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by the states,30 it is an unprecedented use of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, 3 ' and it violates Equal Protection3 2 when analyzed
under the framework of Romer v. Evans."3 This group also
believes that DOMA is unnecessary. The second group believes
DOMA is constitutional for three principle reasons: DOMA pro-
tects the autonomy of both the individual states and of the federal
government; Congress clearly has the power to legislate the Act
using the Full Faith and Credit Clause; and the recent Supreme
Court decision in Romer v. Evans-4 does not provide grounds for
dismissing DOMA as unconstitutional.3 5
I will examine the following arguments: the power of Con-
gress to use the Full Faith and Credit Clause to enact this legisla-
tion; the effect of DOMA on the right of States to allow or prohibit
same sex marriage; the fate of DOMA under Romer v. Evans;3 6
and whether DOMA is a necessary piece of legislation.
III. DOMA IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Professor Lawrence Tribe, Professor of Constitutional Law at
Harvard Law School, argues that DOMA is an exception to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and therefore is, "plainly unconstitu-
tional, both because of the basic 'limited-government' axiom that
ours is a National Government whose powers are confined to those
that are delegated to the federal level in the Constitution itself,
and because of the equally fundamental 'states'-rights' postulate
that all powers not so delegated are reserved to the states and
their people."3 7 Professor Tribe, along with Professor Sunstein,
take issue with the "negative" rather than "unifying" or affirma-
tive language of DOMA. These eminent professors' rejection,
30. 1996 WL 10829449, Same-sex Marriage: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. (July 11, 1996)
(statement of Cass R. Sunstein); 142 Cong. Rec. S5931-01 (1996) (statement of
Lawrence H. Tribe, as read into the Record by Senator Ted Kennedy).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 116 S. Ct. 1620.
34. Id.
35. 1996 WL 10829470, Same-sex Marriage: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. (July 11, 1996) (written
statement of Lynn D. Wardle).
36. 116 S. Ct. 1620.
37. 142 Cong. Rec. S5931-01 (1996) (statement of Lawrence H. Tribe, as read
into the Record by Senator Ted Kennedy).
19961 165
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based upon their categorization of DOMA as an exemption to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, is not warranted, in fact, their con-
cern for limited government is more fully guaranteed by the Act.
A. Congress has the power to enact §2 of DOMA using
"negative" phrasing.
Critics of DOMA argue that §2 is invalid because it is an
exception to the purpose of full faith and credit, or that it is inva-
lid as an unprecedented use of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.3
They claim it is an exception to full faith and credit because it
allows a state not to give full faith and credit to a same-sex mar-
riage recognized in another state and is therefore a negative
rather than affirmative use of the clause. 3 9 They go so far as to
say this "negative" use of full faith and credit is unprecedented.
40
However, it is not unprecedented and has already withstood con-
stitutional scrutiny by the Supreme Court in its analysis of the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA).4 1
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress can either
affirmatively or negatively define the effect that acts, records, and
judgments from one state have upon another state. The PKPA is
an example of such a negative effect. The PKPA limits states to
only three jurisdictional bases upon which they may afford full
faith and credit to custody decrees of another state.4 2 Therefore,
states cannot give full faith and credit to custody decrees based
upon any other jurisdictional base. This statute was challenged in
Thompson v. Thompson,43 where the Supreme Court stated, "As
the legislative scheme suggests, and as Congress explicitly speci-
fied, one of the chief purposes of the PKPA is to 'avoid jurisdic-
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (West 1996); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174
(1988).
42. These jurisdictional bases are: (1) the State exercising jurisdiction must
be the home state of the child on the date of commencement of the proceeding, or
the child's home must have been in the state within six months before the date of
commencement of the proceeding and the contestant continues to live in the
state; (2) no other state would have jurisdiction under (1) and it is in the best
interest of the child that the court assume jurisdiction; (3) child is physically
present in the State and the child has been abandoned or there exists the threat
of abuse. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(c)(2)(A-D) (West 1996).
43. 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
[Vol. 19:159166
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tional competition and conflict between State courts.' 44 This
same statement by the Court applies to DOMA in the context of
avoiding jurisdictional competition and conflicts between state
courts. Under DOMA there would be no jurisdictional competition
or conflicts between states as to the effect of same-sex marriages
because the right of states to not "be required to give effect
to.. .[same-sex marriage]... under the laws of such other state"45
is explicitly protected.
The Supreme Court has consistently searched for the purpose
of legislation without concerning itself with whether the language
is affirmative or negative. In University of Tennessee v. Elliott,46 a
unanimous Court indicated that the intent of Congress is the
issue. Elliott, a black employee of the University of Tennessee,
was informed that he was to be discharged as a result of inade-
quate work performance and misconduct on the job. Elliott
requested a hearing under the Tennessee Administrative Proce-
dure Act which resulted in a finding that his discharge was not
motivated by racial discrimination. Elliott also filed suit in the
United States District Court seeking relief under Title VII for
racial discrimination. The University of Tennessee contended
that Elliott's claim was precluded as to Title VII due to the full
faith and credit requirement that federal courts must give to the
acts of state administrative agencies under 28 U.S.C. 1738. 47
However, the Supreme Court held that full faith and credit only
governs judgments and records of state courts that have been
reviewed by a federal court. In reaching this conclusion the Court
44. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 175.
45. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West 1996).
46. 478 U.S. 788, 797 (1986).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (West 1996) states:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of
the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing
the seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State,
Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in
other courts within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed,
if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that the
said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession
from which they are taken.
1996] 167
9
Brown: Constitutionally Defending Marriage: The Defense of Marriage Act,
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
stated, "invoking the presumption against implied repeal, peti-
tioner distinguishes Chandler as involving a federal agency deter-
mination not entitled to full faith and credit under § 1738.
[citations omitted]... The question actually before us is whether a
common-law rule of preclusion would be consistent with Congress'
intent in enacting Title VII."48 As demonstrated by Justice
White's opinion in Elliott, critics promulgating an argument based
upon affirmative and negative language miss the point of the
Court's analysis, being, congressional intent.
Finally, as Professor Wardle notes in his remarks to the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, the distinction between affirmative and
negative language is basically meaningless - a negative may be
made affirmative by the use of different words. 49 Any rule, includ-
ing §2 of DOMA, may be stated in affirmative or negative lan-
guage. To state §2 affirmatively, "marriages between a man and a
woman that are valid in the state where performed must be recog-
nized in other states, or all marriages valid where performed must
be recognized unless they violate the strong public policy of the
other state."50 As a result, the negative/affirmative argument is
not persuasive.
B. The DOMA protects states' autonomy by allowing them to
choose whether they wish to recognize same-sex
marriages.
Professor Tribe also dismisses DOMA based on a states'
rights argument. He and Professor Sunstein agree that DOMA is
an, "ill-advised intrusion into a problem [meant to be] handled at
the state level."51 However, a reading of the plain language of
DOMA contradicts these assertions. DOMA is not an intrusion by
the federal government into an area reserved for the states, to the
contrary, it is necessary to protect the autonomy of states.
Section 2 of DOMA uses the words, "No State . . . shall be
required." These five words clearly show that Congress does not
48. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796 (1986) (emphasis added).
49. 1996 WL 10829470, Same-sex Marriage: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. (July 11, 1996) (written
statement of Lynn D. Wardle).
50. Id. See also Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289
(1929) ("when a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes
the negative of any other mode").
51. 1996 WL 10829449, Same-sex Marriage: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. (July 11, 1996)
(statement of Cass R. Sunstein).
[Vol. 19:159168
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intend to require a state to do anything. 52 Congress is merely rec-
ognizing an already existing state right to disregard an act, judg-
ment, or decree when it violates a state's legitimate public
policy. 53 While Professor Tribe may be correct in his assertion
that DOMA is redundant in that it reiterates a right that states
already possess, 54 he is incorrect to assert that as a result DOMA
is unnecessary. In fact, given recent decisions by the Supreme
Court espousing "elitist" views of societal values,5 5 Congress is
being prudent in passing this act and reinforcing the constriction
of judicial discretion in the interpretation of the laws.56
The principle of federalism "protects the integrity of the
states from possible overreaching by the national government,
while the Full Faith and Credit Clause protects the states from
possible overreaching by each other."57 DOMA protects states
that do not wish to recognize same-sex marriage from forced rec-
ognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause instigated by
individuals desiring to advance a gay rights agenda. In the wake
of recent Supreme Court decisions like Romer v. Evans,5s and
United States v. Virginia," DOMA is a timely piece of legislation
that protects states' autonomy by prohibiting pro-same-sex mar-
riage states from forcing their policy on other states.60 It is no
secret that gay marriage advocates see Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin 61
52. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (legislative intent predominates over any principles of
statutory construction).
53. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979) ("[Tlhe Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not require a State to apply another State's law in violation of its
own legitimate public policy.").
54. 142 Cong. Rec. S5931-01 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Lawrence
H. Tribe, as read into the Record by Senator Ted Kennedy).
55. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 109 (1991)
(recognizing that it is within the right of Congress to constrain judicial discretion
in the interpretation of laws).
57. 1996 WL 10829470, Same-sex Marriage: Hearings on S. 1740 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. (July 11, 1996) (written
statement of Lynn D. Wardle).
58. 116 S. Ct. 1620.
59. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (finding no "exceedingly persuasive justification"
for state's action in funding all male military college).
60. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335 (1989) (Constitution has a
"special concern" for protecting "the autonomy of the individual States within
their respective spheres."); Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881)
("No state can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction.").
61. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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decision as a mechanism with which to introduce same sex mar-
riage in every state.
Gay marriage advocates unashamedly advance their agenda.
Ms. Deborah M. Henson outlines a detailed argument on how
homosexuals, married in a state recognizing homosexual mar-
riage, may gain incidents of marriage and recognition of the mar-
riage in a state not recognizing homosexual marriage by using the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.62 Ms. Henson recognizes that in
order to accomplish this revolution courts must "revitalize" the
Full Faith and Credit Clause towards the purpose of states not
being able to apply their own laws, "even if it had the requisite
'contact'.. .if, in so doing it would impair a predominant interest of
a sister state or violate a national interest."63 A more blatant
attack on state autonomy is difficult to conceive. Not only would
DOMA protect states who do not desire to recognize homosexual
marriages, but it would prevent gay rights proponents from abus-
ing the federal judicial system to advance their agenda, and it
would clearly define the "national interest" as being in support of
heterosexual marriage.
DOMA would prevent gay rights proponents from using the
federal judiciary to advance causes that are best suited for the leg-
islature. The place of the judiciary has been to expound upon the
Constitution,64 not to substitute the will of the members of the
Supreme Court for the will of the people. This abuse of the judi-
cial system to advance countermajoritarian agendas defeats the
ability of the American people to let their voices be heard in state
legislatures and in the Congress of the United States. Americans
have demonstrated this aversion to judicial replacement of the
legislative will by their poignant reaction to the Hawaii Supreme
Court's likely decision to recognize gay marriage. Currently ten
states65 have passed statutes banning same-sex marriage and
62. Henson, supra note 6, at 584-91.
63. Id. at 588 (citing EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§13.1-2 n.5, at 102 (2d ed. 1992)).
64. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
65. These states include: Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (1991));
Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81r (1995)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-3-3.1 (1996)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (1996)); Indiana (IND. CODE § 31-
7-1-2 (1996)); Louisiana (LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 94 (1993)); Massachusetts
(MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 151B, § 4, historical note (1996)); Minnesota (MIN.
STAT. ANN. § 363.021 (1996)); Texas (TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 1.01 (1995));
Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (1996)).
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twenty-three states 66 have introduced legislation to ban same-sex
marriage. Likewise, DOMA provides a semblance of restraint on
the Federal Judiciary by defining the meaning of marriage and
displaying the intent of Congress to protect the traditional mean-
ing of the word from those that wish to redefine it.
The legislative history of DOMA also clearly defines the
defense of the traditional marriage as a substantial government
interest. The national interest in protecting traditional marriage
is both pragmatic and central to the definition of a family. DOMA
is pragmatic because it protects the definition of" marriage" that
permeates federal law and benefit programs. A redefinition, espe-
cially by the judicial branch, would not coincide with the legisla-
tive intent of the passage of numerous prior laws.6 7 DOMA is
central to the definition of a family because it statutorily protects
the traditional definition of the family and prevents it from fur-
ther breakdown.68
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has a "sub-
stantial interest" in "balancing the interests" of states by "pre-
vent[ing] [one state's] policy from dictating" what the legal policy
of other states will be.69 In United States v. Edge Broadcasting
Company,70 the Supreme Court upheld a restriction on free
speech embodied in 18 U.S.C. §1304, forbidding broadcasters from
carrying advertisements for lotteries if lotteries were forbidden in
66. The following states have introduced legislation banning same-sex
marriage: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Two states have introduced
legislation designed to recognize homosexual marriage, they are: Delaware and
Nebraska.
67. However, this has been done with the Fourteenth Amendment originally
enacted to prohibit discrimination based on race. It now has been interpreted to
apply to everything from homosexuality (Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996))
to debasement of votes (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
68. Hearings on S.1740 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (July 10, 1996) (statement of Gary L. Bauer, "[o]ften I am asked,
what does it matter if two men or two women down the street want to call what
they have 'marriage?" Why does that hurt you or your marriage? Well it doesn't
- unless they bring the law into it. Then the fiction is imposed on everyone and
the counterfeit will do great harm to the special status that the genuine
institution has earned.. .marriage is a unique bonding of the two sexes, with the
probable expectation of procreation of children. It is the core of civilization and is
universally honored.").
69. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
70. Id.
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the state in which the broadcaster was located. The broadcaster
who challenged the law was located in North Carolina, which pro-
hibited lotteries, but 90% of the listeners lived in Virginia, where
lotteries were legal v.7  Even though the overwhelming majority of
listeners lived in a state where allowing lottery advertisements
would not violate its public policy, the Court held that the "con-
gressional policy of balancing the interests of lottery and non-lot-
tery states" was a "substantial governmental interest" that
justified even the prohibition of free speech. 72 A "substantial gov-
ernment interest" existed in Edge because Congress had passed a
statute expressing the interest.
Similarly, DOMA establishes a "substantial government
interest" that recognizes a non-homosexual marriage state's right
to have its laws honored.7 3 DOMA sets out this government inter-
est in the plain meaning of Section 1738C by stating, "No State...
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage
under the laws of such other State... . Congress unequivocally
recognizes the autonomous State's interest that justifies the prohi-
bition of same-sex unions. As a result, Professor Tribe's rejection
is unwarranted. He extols the virtues of limited government
while at the same time rejecting an Act that guarantees limited
government and state autonomy.
C. DOMA legitimately defines the meaning of "marriage" for the
purpose of distributing federal benefits.
Another reason that DOMA is not "pointless" or "irrelevant"
is that it closes a back door through which homosexual marriage
proponents could enter and render a state's policy on marriage
irrelevant. This back door is the redefinition of marriage in order
to obtain federal benefits that would be available even in states
that do not recognize homosexual marriage. Apart from DOMA it
71. The summary of the case is taken from Professor Wardle's statement to
the Senate Judiciary Committee.
72. Edge, 509 U.S. at 428.
73. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980) ("to
vest the power of determining the extraterritorial effect of a State's own laws and
judgments in the [first] State itself risks the very kind of parochial entrenchment
on the interests of other States that it was the purpose of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.. .to prevent").
74. Section 2. Powers Reserved of the States. See supra note 3.
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would be possible for a homosexual couple to marry in a state rec-
ognizing homosexual marriage, move to a state where the mar-
riage is not recognized, and then collect federal benefits of the
marriage, but not enjoy the state benefits of the marriage. Section
3 of DOMA would shut the door on this loophole.
Case law is clear that Congress may use federal law to regu-
late federal benefits. 75 DOMA is not directing states to accept the
federal definition of marriage in §3, it is merely defining the his-
toric definition of marriage under federal law and clarifying who is
eligible to receive federal benefits when previously unambiguous
words like "marriage" and "spouse" are used.76 Therefore, it is dif-
ficult to see how defining marriage as one man and one woman is
unconstitutional 77 unless one considers Romer's equal protection
analysis or the arguments claiming that men and women who
wish to marry someone of the same-sex are somehow being sexu-
ally discriminated against.78
As a result, it is evident that DOMA is not pointless. It
addresses an important void in the law created by attempts to
redefine marriage. DOMA does not impinge on states' rights but
in fact protects states from the possible undermining of their laws
prohibiting homosexual marriage. Finally, DOMA does not abuse
the use of the Full Faith and Credit clause because Congress has
demonstrated and the Supreme Court has affirmed that using the
Clause in a non-affirmative manner is legitimate.
IV. IMPACT OF ROOMER V. EVANS ON THE DOMA.
In 1992 the citizens of the Sate of Colorado adopted an
amendment to their constitution, commonly referred to as Amend-
ment 2, in an attempt to prohibit homosexuals from gaining spe-
cial rights including preferential treatment as a class.7 9 Various
75. See Hisquidero v. Hisquidero, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (control and division of
federal pensions and employment benefits governed by federal laws); Mansell v.
Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989) (Congress may create federal benefits and limit
states' authority over the benefits); 45 U.S.C. § 231 (1986) (use of terms
"husband, wife, spouse" to refer to domestic relations); 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (Supp.
1995) (defines spouse as husband or wife); 22 U.S.C. § 4054 (1986) (uses terms of
"spouse, husband, wife, married, remarried" to describe rights to federal
benefits).
76. See discussion infra Part IV C 2.
77. Even Professor Sunstein does not believe §3 would be found
unconstitutional.
78. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Henson, supra note 6.
79. The amendment reads:
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groups initiated litigation in order to have Amendment 2 declared
unconstitutional. The Colorado District Court enjoined enforce-
ment of the amendment and the State of Colorado appealed to the
Colorado Supreme Court which affirmed the District Court injunc-
tion. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Colo-
rado Supreme Court and held that Amendment 2 violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it was too broad, and because it
served no state interest or legitimate purpose.80 The Romer deci-
sion does nothing to impair the constitutionality of DOMA.
DOMA differs from the Colorado Constitutional amendment
of Romer in at least three distinct ways: (A) DOMA applies no
matter what one's "orientation" is. DOMA applies to homosexuals
and heterosexuals alike. (B) DOMA is much more limited in scope
than Amendment 2. DOMA only applies to the area of marriage,
it does not extend to laws of general applicability. (C) DOMA is
consistent with our constitutional tradition and protects a compel-
ling government interest of the highest order.
A. DOMA applies irrespective of an individual's sexual
orientation.
The Supreme Court rejected Amendment 2 in Romer, because
it was "a status based enactment... [and] a classification of' per-
sons undertaken for its own sake."81 DOMA, on the other hand, is
a conduct based piece of legislation. DOMA was not undertaken
for its own sake, but was enacted to protect the historical defini-
tions of marriage and spouse. While DOMA creates a disparate
impact on homosexuals the impact does not make DOMA
unconstitutional.
Proponents of same sex marriage would correctly argue that
DOMA creates a disparate impact on the class of people who are of
No protected status based on homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual
orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches
or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute
or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to
have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination.
COLO. CONST. art II, § 30b.
80. Romer, 116 S. Ct at 1629.
81. Id.
82. See discussion infra Part IV C.
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the same sex and desire to marry. However, laws creating a dis-
parate impact are not per se unconstitutional. Congress and
states regularly make policy decisions that cause a disparate
impact on one group.8 3
For example, if a person is an alcoholic, and arguably an alco-
holic because of a genetic predisposition towards alcoholism, the
person belongs to the "class of alcoholics." But being a member of
the class of alcoholics does not give him or her the right to drive
while intoxicated. Society has determined that those alcoholics
belonging to the class of alcoholics who drive under the influence
of alcohol can be discriminated against with not only societal dis-
approval, but through fines, suspension of the license to drive and
even imprisonment. To say that the alcoholic has a right to drink
and drive because he or she is a member of a class of alcoholics is
obviously misguided. However, this same reasoning is sometimes
used by same sex marriage proponents. They claim that because
of one's sexual "orientation," as a result of a genetic predisposi-
tion, a right to marry another of the same sex is somehow real-
ized.84 Like the alcoholic claiming a right to drink and drive, they
are claiming a right that does not exist and has never existed.
DOMA is also similar to the employment field. Employers
can enforce policies that deprive people of a job based on conduct.
For example, two employees of the New York City Transit Author-
ity challenged the Transit Authority's policy against employing
persons who use narcotic drugs as being in violation of, among
other things, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Supreme
Court noted that the regulation did not violate equal protection
83. In addition to the two examples given below the Equal Access to Justice
Act is also insightful. The Act allows a monetary award for a prevailing party in
an adjudication before an agency of the United States Government to recover
fees and expenses involved in the action. 5 U.S.C.A. § 504(a)(1) (West 1996).
The act goes on to exclude those whose net worth is more than $2 million.
Federal Reserve System Hearing Rules, 12 CFR § 263.103(b)(1) (1996).
Therefore, Congress made a policy decision, not to discriminate against the rich,
but to determine a point at which one is able to pay for their own defense before a
government agency. The class of people whose net worth is over $2 million
clearly suffer a disparate impact by being denied the right of recovery under the
Equal Access to Justice Act.
84. This conclusion presents another stark conflict of world views. If one
views right and wrong as relative to cultural acceptance or disapproval, then the
result of approving of homosexual behavior naturally follows. However, if one
views right and wrong as resting on absolute standards that do not change then
homosexuality cannot be encouraged.
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"because it does not circumscribe a class of persons characterized
by some unpopular trait or affiliation, [and] it does not create or
reflect any special likelihood of bias on the part of the ruling
majority."8 5 The Court recognized that the transit authority did
create a class but the conduct discrimination was justified. The
United States Code also provides clear evidence that Congress can
make policy decisions that discourage certain kinds of behavior
and encourage others.8 6
Additionally, the Constitution poses no barriers to Congress
defining marriage in the traditional sense of one man and one
woman, and the Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitu-
tion provides no right to homosexuals to engage in sodomy. 7 In
the final analysis DOMA does not conflict with the Court's rejec-
tion of Amendment 2 because DOMA was not undertaken for its
own sake, and the Constitution does not bar Congress' definition
of marriage. DOMA still allows individual states to adopt policies
accepting same-sex "marriage." DOMA, in essence, merely states
a Federal policy and prevents the Hawaii Supreme Court from
redefining marriage for every state and federal purpose.
B. DOMA is much more limited in scope than Amendment 2.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Romer, raises
new questions of constitutional interpretation by stating,
'Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscrimi-
nate imposition of inequalities.' [citations omitted] Respect for
this principle explains why laws singling out a certain class of citi-
zens for disfavored legal status or general hardships are rare. A
law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one
group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the govern-
ment is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most
literal sense. 'The guarantee of 'equal protection of the laws is a
pledge of the protection of equal laws.'88
Sandwiched between two citations to traditional equal protection
analysis is a new element of jurisprudence,. and one could argue
85. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979). See also
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 106 (1979) (upholding mandatory retirement age
for Foreign Service personnel); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 314-17 (1976) (upholding mandatory retirement age for police officers).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1996) (The U.S.C. prohibits one from excluding jurors on
account of their race); 18 U.S.C. §§ 11-115 (1996) (punishment for assault); 18
U.S.C. § 81 (1996) (punishment for arson).
87. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 2844.
88. Romer, 116 S.Ct. at 1628 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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that this language may reach whatever end one desires. The first
sentence focuses on the rarity of laws that single out a class of
people for disfavored treatment. The second sentence focuses on
the generality of a law that pre-empts the ability of the class to
seek aid from the government through other established laws.
These two sentences could lead to different results depending on
which sentence receives the focus.
A focus on the first statement, "laws singling out a certain
class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general hardships
are rare," could be used to argue against DOMA. If one rejects the
argument that DOMA's disparate impact upon homosexuals is
constitutional, then one could say that because DOMA restricts
same-sex partners from receiving federal benefits, then it is a law
"singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status."
Therefore, DOMA denies the equal protection of the laws in the
most literal sense. However, this position presupposes that a
right already exists for homosexual couples to receive benefits in
the same way that married heterosexual couples do. Since no
such rights exist, there is no constitutional prohibition on disal-
lowing homosexual couples the same benefits as married
heterosexuals.
Justice Kennedy's statements are best understood by a focus
on the generality of the law and as a result lead to a different con-
clusion than the analysis discussed above. DOMA is not a general
law denying people fundamental rights. It is true that "[m]arriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and sur-
vival of the race"s9 and as such are fundamental rights.90 How-
ever, a fundamental right to same-sex "marriage" has never been
found by any court. Even the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v.
Lewin held that "the applicant couples do not have a fundamental
constitutional right to same sex marriage arising out of the right
to privacy or otherwise." 91 A fundamental right is one that is
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"9 2 or is "deeply rooted in
89. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
90. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 376 (1978) (statute burdening
fundamental right to marry must pass strict scrutiny test). See also Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888) ([M]arriage is "the most important relation in
life" and "the foundation of the family and society, without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress.); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(recognizing right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children").
91. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993).
92. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326
(1937)).
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this Nation's history and tradition."93 There is no argument to
make for same-sex marriage being a fundamental right unless one
uses the standard of cultural relativism. There is no record of
homosexual activity being "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty" or of homosexuality being "deeply rooted in our Nation's his-
tory and tradition." In fact the opposite is true, homosexuality
violates both tests,94 and as a result homosexuals cannot claim a
fundamental right to marry.
Amendment 2 allegedly nullified specific legal protections
across a broad spectrum, from housing, real estate, insurance and
health benefits, to the "protection of general laws and policies that
prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private set-
tings."95 However, DOMA is very specific, even its harshest critics
would agree that it does not nullify the protection of general laws
to homosexuals. 96 Since DOMA is not a general law depriving a
group of a fundamental right, it does not violate the equal protec-
tion clause. In addition to applying Justice Kennedy's analysis,
examining DOMA under a strict scrutiny analysis validates its
constitutionality.
C. DOMA is consistent with our constitutional tradition and is
narrowly tailored to further a compelling government
interest of the highest order.
Justice Kennedy refers to Amendment 2 as a "sweeping and
comprehensive" change to the legal status of homosexuals.97 Crit-
ics join this observation to the DOMA by taking a later statement
of Justice Kennedy that, "[i]t is not within our constitutional tra-
dition to enact laws of this sort," and charging that DOMA is
based solely on "animus" because it draws explicitly on sexual ori-
entation.9" The critics' argument may be answered by examining
the compelling government interest of Congress in enacting
93. Id. at 192 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
94. For a discussion on the historical prohibitions against homosexuality see
Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual
Activity, 40 U. MiAMi L. REv. 521, 525 (1986).
95. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626.
96. General laws would include those such as housing and real estate. Justice
Kennedy completely avoids mentioning the Court's analysis in Bowers, 478 U.S.
at 186, decided only 10 years earlier and validating a Georgia anti-sodomy law as
constitutional. This type of analysis will be further examined infra Part III.
97. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1625.
98. Statements of Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 51, at 67.
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DOMA. An examination of this interest will show that the law
was not enacted as a result of animus. In addition, DOMA sur-
vives strict scrutiny analysis because it advances a compelling
state interest of the highest order and is "narrowly tailored to fur-
ther [that] compelling state interest."99 Evaluating DOMA under
the strict scrutiny test shows that DOMA was passed to advance a
compelling government interest in at least three ways.10 0 DOMA
protects state sovereignty, it protects the legislative intent in reg-
ulations and laws passed throughout the past 200 years mention-
ing the words "marriage" or "spouse," and it upholds the historical
definition of marriage understood from the traditional moral
beliefs of many Americans. DOMA is also narrowly tailored to
achieve this government interest.
1. The decision of BMW of North America v. Gore,' 0 1 handed
down the same day as Romer, shows how essential it is
for each state to be able to decide important legal policy
issues for itself.
After Gore purchased a new BMW automobile from an
authorized Alabama dealer, he discovered that the car had been
repainted. He brought suit for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages against the American distributor of BMWs, alleging, that the
failure to disclose the repainting constituted fraud under Alabama
law. At trial, BMW acknowledged that it followed a nationwide
policy of not advising its dealers, and therefore their customers, of
pre-delivery damage to new cars when the cost of repair did not
exceed 3 percent of the car's suggested retail price. Gore's vehicle
fell into that category. The jury returned a verdict finding BMW
liable for compensatory damages of $4,000, and assessing $4 mil-
lion in punitive damages. The trial judge denied BMW's post-trial
motion to set aside the punitive damages award, holding, among
other things, that the award was not "grossly excessive" and thus
did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed, but reduced the
99. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1960 (1996) (concerning redistricting). See
also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
100. While the Romer court makes poignantly clear the fact that legislation
may not be enacted based on "animus," the opinion does not go so far as to throw
out the rational basis test and even implies that if the Court could have found a
rational basis for Colorado's Amendment 2 then it would have passed the test.
See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627-29.
101. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
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award to $2 million on the ground that, in computing the amount,
the jury had improperly multiplied Gore's compensatory damages
by the number of similar sales in all States, not just those in
Alabama. 10 2
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the award was grossly
excessive and therefore violated the constitutional limit. The
court reasoned that the inquiry begins by examining the interest
of the state the award was designed to serve. The Court concluded
that, "while we do not doubt that Congress has ample authority to
enact such a policy for the entire Nation, it is clear that no single
State could do so, or even impose its own policy choice on neigh-
boring States." "No State can legislate except with reference to its
own jurisdiction. Each State is independent of all the others in
this particular." 0 3 Additional examples abound, clearly showing
that states only have the power to legislate and adjudicate with
regard to their own territory.10 4
Considering both Gore and Romer leads to the conclusion that
DOMA should be found constitutional because it protects states
from infringements resulting from other states' public policies.
However, this infringement upon the public policy of other states
is precisely what many same-sex marriage proponents seek. 10 5
Critics of DOMA are challenging Chief Justice White's observa-
tion in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, °6 that it is "obvious" a
102. The facts are taken from the syllabus of the case and the parenthetical
explanations contained in the third paragraph, as well as infra note 105, are
those written by the court in Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1597 n.16.
103. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1596-97 (citing Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592,
594 (1881)).
104. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975) ("A State does not
acquire power or supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely
because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be affected when they
travel to that State."); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914):
It would be impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate
beyond the jurisdiction of that state . . .without throwing down the
constitutional barriers by which all the States are restricted within the
orbits of their lawful authority, and upon the preservation of which the
government under the Constitution depends. This is so obviously the
necessary result of the Constitution that it has rarely been called in
question, and hence authorities directly dealing with it do not abound.
Id. at 161. See also Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892) ("Laws have
no force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the state which enacts them,
and can have extra-territorial effect only by the comity of other states.").
105. Henson, supra note 6 at 561.
106. 234 U.S. 149, 162 (1914).
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state's statute cannot operate beyond the bounds of the state
where the statute is enacted.
2. DOMA protects the legislative intent in regulations and
laws passed throughout the past 200 years which mention
the words "marriage" or "spouse."
Until very recently no one would have questioned the intent
of a legislative body when they enacted a law which included the
words "marriage" or "spouse" in it. 10 7 Persons reading the law
would immediately know that marriage meant the union of one
man and one woman. Additionally one would know that "spouse"
meant either the male husband or the female wife of the marriage.
DOMA protects these definitions contained in federal and state
laws enacted since the founding of this country.
For example, 26 U.S.C.A. § 22, originally passed in 1954 as
part of the Internal Revenue Code, uses the words "spouse" and
"marriage" to refer to a marriage made up of a husband and
wife.' 0 8 5 U.S.C.A. §8901, passed in 1966 and relating to employ-
ees' health insurance, provides certain rights for those who are
former spouses, or unremarried former spouses.10 9 When these
pieces of legislation were passed it is highly unlikely that those
voting imagined that some day people would seek to apply those
same words of spouse and marriage to homosexual couples. In
fact the legislature's intent of a one man one woman marriage is
clear in most of these acts by including terms such as husband
and wife when referring to the marriage union.110 The legislative
intent of these acts may easily be thwarted without DOMA due to
107. Over 1,000 references are made to "spouse" or "marriage" in the United
States Code.
108. 26 U.S.C.A. § 22(e)(1-2) (West 1996).
109. 5 U.S.C.A. § 8901(10)(C)(iii) (West 1996).
110. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(35) (West 1996) ("The term 'spouse', 'Wife', or
'husband' do not include a spouse, wife, or husband by reason of any marriage
ceremony where the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in the
presence of each other, unless the marriage shall have been consummated."); 22
U.S.C.A. § 4044(13) (West 1996) ("'surviving spouse' means the surviving wife or
husband of a participant or annuitant who, was married to the participant or
annuitant for at least 9 months immediately preceding his or her death or is a
parent of a child born of the marriage. . . ."); 38 CFR § 3.50 ( c ), reprinted in 38
U.S.C.A. App. (West 1996) ("'Spouse' means a person of the opposite sex who is a
wife or husband and the term 'surviving spouse' means a person of the opposite
sex who is a widow or widower...."); 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(h)(1)(B)(i) (West 1996) ("a
valid marriage if the insured individual and the person entitled to benefits as the
wife or husband of the insured individual .... ").
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the probability that the Hawaii Supreme Court will redefine mar-
riage to include persons of the same sex. As a result of this redefi-
nition the intent of the legislature to provide benefits for
traditional marriage partners would be made irrelevant and con-
sidered out of touch with the current culture.
The holding in Gore and the protection of legislative intent
when using the words marriage and spouse, however, are not the
only grounds supporting DOMA. It is also clear from the Congres-
sional Record that DOMA has a compelling government interest
and is not being enacted out of pure animosity towards
homosexuals.
3. DOMA upholds the historical definition of marriage
derived from the common moral beliefs of many
Americans.
A review of the debates over DOMA in the Senate and the
House of Representatives contained in the Congressional Record
shows that there is a compelling state interest involved and not
merely "animus" directed towards homosexuals. This compelling
state interest enables DOMA to survive review when tested by the
courts. Although Romer used rational basis review, DOMA would
survive a strict scrutiny analysis. A review of the debates over
DOMA demonstrates compelling government interests and
objectives.
The re-introduction of the DOMA by Senator Nickles to the
Senate outlines the purposes of the bill. Mr. Nickles suggests that
the bill is necessary because of the concern among several states
that another state's recognition of same-sex marriage will compro-
mise their own laws, to "help the Federal Government defend its
own traditional and commonsense definitions of "marriage" and
"spouse," and to recognize in law what has been the common
understanding of marriage throughout recorded history.111 Sena-
tor Nickles says the bill is justified because, "it is based on com-
mon understanding rooted in our nation's history, it merely
reaffirms what each Congress and every executive agency have
meant for 200 years when using the words "marriage" and
"spouse". . .[and] [t]he bill does not change state law . . .[nor]
revoke[ ] rights."112
111. 142 Cong. Rec. S9072-02, at 59073 (daily ed. July 29, 1996) (statement of
Senator Nickles).
112. Id.
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In Romer, the majority emphasizes that, "[i]f the constitu-
tional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything,
it must at the very least mean that a bare... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate govern-
mental interest."1 3 Unlike Colorado's Amendment 2, nothing in
Senator Nickles' remarks, or the remarks made in the House of
Representatives, indicates any bare desire to harm homosexuals.
Instead the desire is to protect the institution of marriage and the
integrity of federal statutes." 4 One poignant demonstration of
the true purpose of the Act is evidenced in Congressman Talent's
support.
In the House of Representatives, Congressman Talent
answers those who claim that the bill unjustifiably discriminates
against "loving homosexual partners."
[TIhis bill maintains the standards of our society; and whenever
you maintain a standard, you necessarily place a burden on those
who don't meet the standard. Our society has a standard against
.... polygamy .... [and] incest .... Our society is hurting so badly
that I'm for almost any kind of real love or commitment. But there
is a limit to how much we can change the organic institutions of
our society in response to the alienation some people feel. We live
in a free country, where people can live pretty much as they want.
It is free precisely because we have standards . . .Those who
oppose this bill are either seeking no standards or a standard
vastly different from that sanctioned by millennia of tradition, the
teachings of all the monotheistic religions, and in particular the
teachings of Judeo-Christian religion on which our culture is
based.. .Those who support this [homosexual] agenda [in opposi-
tion to the bill] are attacking the marriage institution in support
of their cultural goals."'
Congressman Talent makes clear that the impetus behind the bill
is not an attempt to harm homosexuals. The beliefs of many
Americans and the motivation behind DOMA are clearly
113. Romer, 116 S.Ct. at 1628 (citing Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)).
114. See also Romer, 116 S.Ct at 1628 ("laws enacted for broad and ambitious
purposes often can be explained by reference to legitimate public policies which
justify the incidental disadvantages they impose on certain persons." (emphasis
added)).
115. 142 Cong. Rec. E1346-01 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of
Congressman Talent). See also 142 Cong. Rec. H7480-05 (daily ed. July 12,
1996) (statement of Congresswoman Seastrand, "I believe [DOMA] reinforces the
traditional definition of marriage without subjecting same-sex couples to bias or
harassment.. .this bill will fortify marriage against the storm of revisionism.").
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expressed by Congressman Barr's statement that, "the flames of
self-centered morality are licking at the very foundations of our
society: the family unit.. .we must maintain a moral foundation,
an ethical foundation for our families and ultimately the United
States of America."116 This belief is evidenced by the flurry of
activity in the states to pass statutes invalidating same sex mar-
riage in their states.1 1 7 The purpose of DOMA then, is to main-
tain a standard, a standard that has been historically recognized
throughout the world."'
4. DOMA is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
governmental interest.
In order for a statute to pass strict scrutiny analysis it must
be "drawn in narrow terms to accomplish those interests [for
which it was adopted]."" 9 A statute demonstrates its narrowness
by having no less restrictive means available with which to accom-
plish the compelling government interests. 2 0 If DOMA is held to
be subject to strict scrutiny, there are no less restrictive means to
accomplish the compelling government interest of maintaining the
traditional definition of marriage than what DOMA provides. Any
statute that defines marriage as less than "the union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife" would fall short of
accomplishing the compelling government interests explained in
the previous sections. DOMA does not go so far as to expressly
forbid same-sex marriage but acknowledges that the States may
still recognize such "marriages." Because any statute requiring
less than DOMA would fall short of the compelling government
interest and because states may make their own laws in regards
to homosexual marriage the Act is therefore narrowly tailored.
D. The future of DOMA
It would seem clear from the compelling government interests
DOMA protects that the courts would have no trouble finding
DOMA constitutional. However, the Congressional Record is not
116. 142 Cong. Rec. H7480-05 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of
Congressman Barr).
117. See supra notes 65 and 66.
118. Hearings on S.1740 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (July 10, 1996) (statement of Gary L. Bauer).
119. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
546 (1993).
120. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988).
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silent with respect to those opposing DOMA and who view it as a
gay-bashing, homophobic piece of legislation. 12 1 This minority
would have the courts redefine marriage if their attempt fails in
the open debate of the legislature. This is the same minority that
propelled the overturn of a Colorado State Constitutional Amend-
ment approved by a majority of the voters. 122
Since there are both adamant proponents and opponents to
the Act, and both emphasize distinct and diametrically opposed
world views, the final question comes down not to the best legal
analysis or argument, but to which world view courts will adopt.
In order to deem homosexual marriage a fundamental right by
judicial fiat begs the question that marriage can be defined differ-
ently than how it has been defined for millennia. 2 3 Although
marriage has undergone some changes, the changes have always
occurred by a consensus of the community and reflected their
shared values. The changes were not imposed by a group of elite
judges. However, should courts decide to wield their power to
examine DOMA they should find compelling government interests
to uphold its constitutionality even if they view it as disadvanta-
geous to one group.
The Supreme Court recently recognized that, "laws enacted
for broad and ambitious purposes often can be explained by refer-
ence to legitimate public policies which justify the incidental dis-
advantages they impose on certain persons."12 4 It would be an
overstatement to proclaim DOMA an "ambitious" policy since it
merely seeks to define a traditional term in its traditionally
understood way. However, Senator Nickles' remarks explain and
justify any "incidental disadvantages" DOMA imposes on certain
homosexuals. If the definition of marriage along traditional
guidelines in order to protect 200 years of congressional intent
121. 142 Cong. Rec. E1320-02 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of
Congresswoman Collins); 142 Cong. Rec. H7480-05 (daily ed. July 12, 1996)
(statement of Congressman Frank); 142 Cong. Rec. H7480-05 (daily ed. July 12,
1996) (statement of Congressman Meehan, "[!]f gay people are considered
"different" today, who is to say your lifestyle or my lifestyle will not be considered
different tomorrow?"); 142 Cong. Rec. H7480-05 (daily ed. July 12, 1996)
(statement of Congressman Skaggs, bill is motivated by hostility towards gays
and lesbians).
122. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 ("claim that right to engage in... [homosexual
behavior] is 'deeply rooted in the Nations history and tradition' or implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious").
124. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
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when legislating using the terms "spouse" and "marriage" is not
enough to justify DOMA then it is hard to imagine what could jus-
tify it. Additionally, the remarks of the congressmen and con-
gresswomen speaking in defense of DOMA point towards
"traditional" notions of morality and definitions of the family as
the underpinnings of DOMA.
If courts adopt the world view of "truth as tied to an absolute
standard" then DOMA will be found constitutional. If courts
adopt the world view that truth is whatever society says it is then
DOMA may very well be declared unconstitutional. Unfortu-
nately, DOMA's reliance on morality may be its biggest weakness
in the eyes of many on the Supreme Court. One could envision a
court throwing moral arguments to the wind and trying to justify
the unconstitutionality of DOMA using the "animus" theory
advanced in Romer, or something along the lines of the recently
invented "exceedingly persuasive justification" test for discrimina-
tion based on sex.125 The evidence from the Congressional Record
appears overwhelmingly in favor of DOMA based on protection of
the traditional definition of marriage, but unfortunately this pro-
tection is viewed by those "incidentally disadvantaged," and
others, 126 as animus.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it would be appropriate to remember a sage
observation made by Chief Judge Wilkerson of the 4th Circuit
Court of Appeals in Thomasson v. Perry. 27 Judge Wilkerson
wrote, "Whether members of the judicial branch agree or disagree
with that [legislative] choice is irrelevant, for the Constitution
envisions the rule of law, not the reign of judges." 28 This debate
over homosexual marriage is ultimately not a legal issue. It is a
challenge to whether majoritarian principles of morality, truth
tied to an objective standard, can inform public policy. If one de-
links traditional moral principles from public policy we sever the
constitution from its anchor and are left adrift in a sea of
relativism.
125. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996) (requiring an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" in order to discriminate based on sex).
126. Those "incidentally damaged" are persons desiring to "marry" someone of
the same sex. See also infra note 121.
127. 80 F.3d 915 (4 th Cir. 1996).
128. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 929.
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The battle lines have been drawn. Truth as an objective stan-
dard and truth as determined by culture are mutually exclusive
positions. One view will prevail, and the one that does will shape
policy and judicial decisions regarding homosexual marriage.
Clearly, the most equitable place for people to voice their opinion
is in the legislature where each side is entitled to express their
views through their representatives. The people have spoken by
overwhelmingly supporting DOMA. However, the courts will
most likely end up being the final arbitrators of this issue. If the
judges decide to reign, DOMA may easily be shipwrecked on the
rocks of revisionism and found unconstitutional. If judges choose
the rule of law, DOMA has no legitimate enemies.
Leonard G. Brown III
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